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an adequate response of the international community to health emergencies such as the spread of the virus
Ebola in 2014. This notwithstanding, WHO's Member States appear reluctant to comply with the IHR and in
particular they violate the ban on unnecessary trade and travel restrictions. After having presented the lack of
compliance with the IHR, the present article analyses the means at the disposal of the WHO for sanctioning
the behaviour of its Member States, both from the perspective of WHO's internal rules and from the perspec-
tive of the law of international responsibility, evaluating if countermeasures might represent a viable solution.
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1 The pathological lack of compliancewith the 2005 InternationalHealth
Regulations
Ensuring compliance with their own rules is a crucial task for international organisations.1 In the case of the
World Health Organization (WHO), the lack of compliance with the 2005 International Health Regulations
(IHR)2 has become a rather pathological situation.3 Such a pathology is already well known and it is rooted in
WHO’s Member States’ attitude toward the respect of IHR and even the Organisation’s own recommendations
during epidemic outbreaks. In fact, practice reveals that Member States’ quite often violate both the IHR and
WHO's recommendations, thus posing a threat to a communitarian management of health crises and calling
the WHO to react.
The Organisation, however, does not currently appear able to sanction the behaviour of its members who
violate these norms and, consequently, it does not seem fit to halt this practice. This is clear from WHO’s own
assessment of its ability to react to IHR violations during an epidemic outbreak. The Ebola Interim Assessment
Panel, established by the Executive Board of the WHO to assess the response of the international community
to the spread of the Ebola virus,4 clearly outlined this problem in its final report published in July 2015.5 In the
report, the Panel urged the WHO to establish and implement a mechanism that allows for the sanctioning of
Member States, which directly or indirectly violate the IHR and/or the Organisation’s own recommendations.6
Certainly, this is not the first warning that WHO has received. The assessment of Member States’ response to
the 2009 bird flu epidemic (the H1N1 virus), in fact, brought similar issues to light.7 It is with no surprise that
this problem has become a central one in the WHO Director General’s speeches, which demonstrates that the
Organisation’s management has no intention of hiding the problem.8
So, what are the IHR violations that makeWHO accept the blame? The Director General’s speech referred to
above could help identify at least two categories of violations. The first can be summarised as a general problem
of compliance with the IHR. As the Director General admitted: «[e]ight years after the IHR entered into force,
fewer than a third of WHO Member States meet the minimum requirements for core capacities to implement
the IHR».9
The second category – that will be the object of this article – groups together a series of violations of the IHR
and of WHO recommendations and refers to cases where WHO Member States adopt containment measures
Andrea Spagnolo is the corresponding author.
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that are stricter than those requested by WHO. These measures are frequently seen as severely limiting com-
munication with States that have been hit by epidemics. In some cases, these measures can amount to a severe
limitation of individuals’ freedom of movement and of trade relationships.
As this article will show, IHR violations belonging to the second cateogory are serious for two reasons.
Firstly, because they severely reduce the effectiveness of a coordinated international response during an epi-
demic outbreak and, secondly, because they attack WHO’s credibility. In fact, the rules that are frequently
violated were designed and implemented by an authority – the WHO – that should be able to coordinate and
to guarantee effective action during an epidemic outbreak. They are also rules that the Organisation’s Member
States have agreed to adopt and to abide by.
Against this background, it would be natural to wonder what tools WHO has at its disposal to urge on its
Member States to respect IHR or to sanction their violations. In particular, it might be of interest to scrutinize
if general international law can offer a remedy to the lack of compliance; namely, if the WHO could adopt
countermeasures to this end.
Countermeasures can be seen as an evolution of the concept of retaliation. They are tools that States use to
induce other States to cease violating a commitment made under international law.10 Countermeasures are a
powerful tool as they can lead to certain international rules being suspended between parties. They are liter-
ally “self-help” measures that States can ultimately turn to should violation of an international law obligation
threaten their interests.11
The adoption of countermeasures by international organisations «is not categorically ruled out»,12 although
it seems obvious that they represent a limited and extreme scenario. It is no coincidence that the International
Law Commission’s (ILC) Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja, who we just quoted earlier, maintains that «[t]he
question of countermeasures was the most difficult for the Commission»13 during the drafting of the Draft
Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations (DARIO).
The hurdles that the ILC had to cope with concern the nature of international organisations and their rela-
tionships with their Member States. With the first profile, it is important to recall that resorting countermea-
sures is a typical prerogative of States’ exercise of sovereign powers. It could be held, in fact, that States resort
to countermeasures as they are primary subjects of international law. But, can the same be said of international
organisations? This line of research was explored several years ago14 and led us to believe that international or-
ganisations can, in principle, adopt countermeasures in the relationship with other international organisations,
or with non-member States.15 However, it is still unclear and obscure whether, to what extent and under what
conditions an international organisation can resort to countermeasures in the relationship with its Member
States.
Relationships of this kind are particularly important for the purpose of this article asWHO’s membership is
(almost) universal. For this reason, this investigation will focus on the relationships between the Organisation
and itsMember States. Obviously, situationswhereWHOhas had to “react” to other international organisations
cannot be excluded, but, as we will explain later, the most obvious problem lies in the relationship between the
WHO and its members.
The research hypothesis is that, at least on paper, resorting to countermeasures could be a useful tool to help
WHO reduce IHR violations, but it is not plausible. Such a hypothesis will lead to a general reflection on the
attitude of the WHO toward the lack of compliance with the IHR in the management of international health
crises. An attitude that seems to be accommodated by the current state of the art of the law on international
organisations.
To develop this idea, this article is then divided into two parts. The first will present WHO’s problems of
compliancewith the IHR in thewider context of the Organisation’s role in themanagement of health crises; this
part will be closed by explaining that the lack of compliance is due to a lack of a sanctioning mechanism, which
deprive the WHO of any possible deterrent to a widespread State’s practice of violating the IHR. Moving from
the conclusion of the first part, the second one will explore an alternative route: the law regulating the adoption
of countermeasures by international organisations against their Member States as codified by the ILC, with a
view of analysing the legal constraints and the political hurdles surrounding the resort to countermeasures
by the WHO for sanctioning the violation of the IHR. This second part will also scrutinize if WHO’s Member
States could resort to countermeasures in their inter se relationships. In the final paragraph of the article the
analysis performed in the two parts will help formulating some general reflections that go beyond the specific
case.
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2 The role of theWorldHealthOrganization andof the 2005 InternationalHealth
Regulations in themanagement of health crises
Violations that threaten the effectiveness and credibility of WHO’s actions can be traced back to certain States’
negative attitudes towards the content of the 2005 IHR. Therefore, it is necessary to outline the norm features
that these States violate, which will help to explain the gravity of their violations. It is equally useful to under-
stand the IHR in the context they have been adopted.
The treaty that establishedWHO is defined as the Organisation’s “Constitution” .16 Labels usually say little
of the nature or content of an international treaty; however, as concerns the WHO, the choice of the term does
not seem coincidental. In fact, on paper, the Organisation’s powers described in its Constitution are broad and
penetrating enough to impact Member States’ behaviour significantly and to affect the international commu-
nity’s overall ability to avoid epidemics from spreading and help improve health standards.17
The powers referred to above are listed in Art. 2 of the Constitution which is a very long and complex norm
that lists around twenty functions for WHO to implement.18 They range from the definition of technical stan-
dards (Letter D) to the coordination of the international community’s efforts regarding health care (Letter A).
Such a wide range of functions contributed to strengthening WHO’s public dimension,19 which has increas-
ingly supported the technical one and continues tomake theOrganisation stand out.20 In fact, it looks likeWHO
wants to be recognised as the leading international organisation for health rights,21 appointed by a universal
and vocational mandate.22
The public implications of WHO’s mandate are particularly obvious when we consider its copious produc-
tion of norms – or para-norms – i. e. its ability to design and impose standards of conduct in health matters
on Member States.23 WHO’s competence for drafting regulations binding upon its member states originates
from Art. 21 and 22 of its Constitution. The former gives the Organisation the powers to impose regulations on
certain subjects.24 The latter closely defines the conditions under which such norms come into force and impact
on the organisation’s Member States obligations and, lastly, the moment in which they take legal effect.
This last point is interesting and characterises WHO’s issue of norms. In fact, Art. 22 states that regulations
adopted by the Organisation come into force unless Member States oppose it before a certain date. This is the
procedure thatMember States use to express their consent, albeit implicitly, to adhere to and abide by the norms
that the Organisation has decided to adopt.25 The IHR were adopted in 2005 following this procedure.
This is the reason why there is uncertainty on their legal nature, as on one side they can be classified as
WHO’s binding acts, but on the other side they also possess characteristics that are typical of international
treaties.26 It is reasonable to maintain that they are unilateral acts of the WHO because they were formally
adopted through a World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolution27 grounded in Art. 21 and 22 of the Constitu-
tion. Viewed from this standpoint, it is difficult to exclude the IHR from the category of the “rules of the or-
ganisations”, which includes «the constituent instruments, relevant decisions and resolutions, and established
practice of the Organisation».28 On the other hand, the are some factors that might lead to consider the IHR
under a different lens. In fact, it is to be noted that States’ consent, albeit even tacit, is necessary to the entry
into force of the Regulations.29 Moreover, the IHR are registered with the UN’s Secretary General under Art.
102 of the UN Charter30 and, thus, are open to the ratification to WHO Non-Member States.31 Lastly, they al-
low Member States to formulate reservations.32 To sum up, the IHR share features with common international
treaties, appearing, therefore, as a set of obligations agreed between Member States.33
We can reasonably conclude that the IHR are an act of a sui generisnature,34 being, at the same time ,rules
of the organisation and obligations arising from a treaty concluded by WHO Member States. It is probably
impossible to draw a clear-cut line to choose the “right” nature of this peculiar act and as we will see later, this
conclusion has an impact on the application on the rules on countermeasures.
The 2005 version of the Regulations is the second one. The first dates back to 1951, when WHO adopted
the International Sanitary Regulations which later became the International Health Regulations in 1969 after
its first overhaul. The model that the first version was inspired by is very different from the current one as it
determined specific categories of “illnesses” and only regulated Member States’ conduct in those cases. The
following version of the IHR, i. e. the current one, was approved in 2005 and does not specify the type of ill-
ness, referring only to an «illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source that presents or could
present significant harm to humans».35 This means that the current version of IHR appears to be a flexible tool
that could be applied in future epidemics, even though they are still unknown today.36
Innovations in the new version of the IHR do not only concern their field of application.37 The 2005 Regula-
tions create a sophisticated system for handling health crises imposing a number of obligations upon Member
States. In particular, the latter are obliged to set up national focal points38; they also have to monitor and re-
port events to WHO that could lead to the spreading of an epidemic39 as well as share information.40 More in
general, States are requested to «develop, strengthen and maintain, as soon as possible but no later than five
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years from the entry into force of these Regulations for that State Party, the capacity to respond promptly and
effectively to public health risks and public health emergencies of international concern».41
As we mentioned earlier, these obligations have been designed to make WHO’s coordination role increas-
ingly effective, especially during particularly serious situations.42 In fact, the WHO was assigned the power
to examine information it receives from Member States43 and to assess if conditions are met to declare the ex-
istence of a «public health emergency of international concern».44 Should this be the case, and after having
established an emergency committee, the WHO has the power to adopt temporary recommendations aimed at
containing the health crisis.45 Such recommendations are not binding, but they are of fundamental importance
as they represent the tool that WHO uses to suggest the best measures for States to adopt.46 It is no coincidence
that Art. 43 of the IHR gives WHO the power to make States justify their lack of respect of these recommen-
dations. As we will see in the following paragraph, the concrete application of Art. 43 is at the centre of the
Organisation’s problems.
3 Theban on imposing unnecessary containmentmeasures
The purpose and scope of the IHR (2005) are rather ambitious:
«to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread
of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid
unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade»47
The article mentioned above clearly shows the rationale of the IHR. When there is the risk of an epidemic
creating international level consequences, Member States have to respect the standards of conduct that are
outlined in the Regulations and set out by the WHO avoiding excessive measures. The last point is crucial as it
describes more than others the nature of the IHR. In fact, the IHR appear not just as “minimal” safeguards, but
as limits for States to operate within.48 To put it plainly, it is up to the WHO to set standards that balance the
adoption of measures to contain health emergencies with the need to safeguard the economic and trade ties,
and more in general the travel arrangements, with the Countries affected by an epidemic.49
This appears clearly when reading another IHR norm, the alreadymentioned Art. 43.50 This complex article
basically authorises Member States to adopt additional epidemic containment measures beyond those covered
inWHO’s own regulations and recommendations, by adopting a formula that is very similar to the “equivalent
protection” devoloped in international human rights law. As long as States’ measures are of equal or better
effectiveness compared to the Organisation’s standards, they can be considered IHR compatible.51 However,
these States are not free to adopt any measure they consider suitable to contain an epidemic. In fact, Art. 43
imposes a ban on States adopting measures that indiscreetly limit the movement of people and trade flows.52
The relationship between the WHO and its Member States in the implementation of additional measures is
similar to that characterizing the reception of international rules in domestic legal orders. In fact, the IHR allow
States to choose which health measures to adopt during an epidemic, especially if they are more effective. The
same regulations, however, pose a sort of “counter limit”53 on this freedom bymaintaining that such measures
do not exaggeratedly affect the movement of people or goods.
The imposition of such a limit seems to be inspired by a threefold rationale. Firstly, it tends to protect those
States that have been hit by the epidemic. Secondly, it operates as an incentive for States to respect their obli-
gations to report epidemic outbreaks. Lastly, it seems to emphasise WHO’s central role in defining universally
accepted standards.
WHO is particularly interested by the first rationale and in fact it is invariably on the Organisation’s agenda
at public meetings. States hit by epidemics need many different types of aid, not only those immediately con-
nected to containing the illness, but also – and more general – aid that helps to maintain the Country’s very ex-
istence. It should not be forgotten that in the vast majority of cases – or at least in documented cases to date
– serious international health crises have hit developing Countries, which are already wanting from certain
points of view, in particular when they are in a post-conflict phase. It is useful to recall that the United Nations
General Assembly decided to establish a task force to cope with the spread of the virus Ebola because it was
concerned «about the potential reversal of the gains made by the affected countries in peacebuilding, political
stability and the reconstruction of socioeconomic infrastructure in recent years».54 Once in place, embargoes
against such States would only lead to aggravating the population’s living standards, which have already been
compromised by the spreading of the disease. Additionally, excessive restrictions can negatively impact the
movement of “health staff”, who the States – and the WHO itself – have sent to try to physically contain the
epidemic.55
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the ban on imposing excessive measures beyond those recommended by
WHO represents an incentive for States to respect the obligation contained in the IHR to report epidemic events.
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In fact, it is obvious that if they believed there was a risk of enduring restrictive measures that would impact
trade, States would have very little incentive to report any outbreak which could potentially develop into a
health crisis.56 This would inevitably undermine the capacity of the international community as a whole to
react.
The third aspect to consider concerns WHO’s role. Obviously, setting universal and compulsory standards
helps awarding the organisation a central role in coordinating States’ action in order to avoid unilateral de-
viations.57 The centrality of such a role is reinforced as derogation to such standards are permitted only on
exceptional and motivated basis.
In this regard, it must be stressed that the IHR give WHO a key role in handling health crises and this rep-
resents a real change compared to the 1969 regulations. In fact, the new role of the WHO seems to characterise
the current version.58 The new international health security regime created by the 2005 version of the IHR is
based on prevention and centralization of the reaction. As held by some Authors, this system builds upon the
creation of a network where States are more and more interconnected through a central hub that was promptly
identified in theWHO.59 Indeed,WHOwas given the specific task to coordinate and articulate the international
community’s response to serious international health crises, like epidemic outbreaks; as anAuthor pointed out,
«WHOwas created to be an orchestrator».60
WHO’s central role is even clearer when we consider the specific ban on imposing excessive measures or
controls. The Organisation is responsibile to evaluate such measures on the basis of the scientific motivations
that the adopting States must produce under the previously mentioned Art. 43. Basically, the “counter limit”
that the ban on excessive measures represents can be bypassed when the interested State demonstrates that its
actions are unavoidable. And it is up to the WHO to determine if a measure was unavoidable or not. Such a
competence is transferred toWHO by its Member States though the acceptance of the IHR and the non-exercise
of the right to contracting out from the regulations, explicitly set out in Art. 59.61
In other words, halting States from imposing excessive or disproportionate limitations on the movement of
people or goods is in line with WHO’s updated role. In fact, WHO, as per its Constitution, is an international
organisation equipped to coordinate States’ conduct when a health crisis is declared, thus avoiding a situation
where States react chaotically and independently.62
4 The violations of the ban in practice
Such an ambitious objective is not always carried through into the practical procedure of imposing excessive
containmentmeasures. But beforemoving on to analyse the unilateral actions undertaken by the States, it could
be interesting to cite the position that the Swiss government maintained during the negotiations of the IHR in
2005. The extract under discussion is so explanatory that it is worth quoting in its entirety:
«in accordance with the WHO constitution […] the State’s sovereignty to choose a higher level of pro-
tection for its population than the internationally agreed minimal standard should be respected by the
IHR»63
It confirms a widespread belief among States: the adoption of the IHR must not impact on their freedom to
adopt containment measures. In other words, WHO Member States consider the regulations the same way
they consider the minimum protection standards: they can easily be ignored, in favour of stricter containment
measures.64
And in practice, this tendency is even clearer.
During the H1N1 virus infection in 2009, it was unsure how the virus was spread,65 but some States sup-
ported the theory that pork meat was responsible, especially if it had been minced in the US or Mexico, where
it was said that the infection have originated.66 Even though there was no scientific proof to support this the-
ory and WHO had categorically excluded it,67 along with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Food and
Agricultural Organisation and theWorld Organisation for Animal Health,68 many States imposed bans on pork
meat imports from States where the flu had originally started.69
The adoption and the enforcement of such restrictive measures were discussed within the WTO. In that
context emerged that the Chinese government imposed a ban on pork meat imports from the US, Mexico and
Canada on the presumption that: «China was the world’s biggest producer of pork and that pork was the most
consumed meat product in the country».70 The Philippines government adopted precautionary restrictions
against the same States, although they removed them a few weeks later. Similar measures were also adopted
by the Indonesian government. In this last case, it was not only against the three “original” states, but also
against France, Spain, New Zealand and Israel. The reasons presented by Indonesia were even clearer as they
were linked to the necessity to «protect its territory and industries from the virus».71 It is also interesting to
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consider the ban imposed by Ghana, which justified its actions by also referring to the necessity to respond to
its people’s concern.72 Apart from those already mentioned, an additional twenty countries, fourteen of them
were WTOMembers, also imposed commercial restrictions on Mexico.
Alongside the measures to impose strict restrictions on the import of pork meat, some Countries severely
limited freedom of movement of citizens from States that had been hit by the epidemic.73 The case of the forty
Mexican citizens put in quarantine by the Chinese government is exemplary and well known. The latter gov-
ernment worried that theMexicans would spread the virus in China and so once again the IHRwere violated.74
The Chinese government justified such action as necessary «to put the virus under control and safeguard peo-
ple’s health and hygienic safety».75 It is interesting to note that in the official statement that announced and
justified the quarantine the IHR were not even mentioned.
States’ responses to the spreading Ebola virus in 2014 were not that different from the spreading of the
H1N1 virus. In fact, Canada and Australia adopted measures restricting freedom of movement of citizens from
States affected by the Ebola virus epidemic, including the suspension of granting visas.76 These last measures
even induced the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to request Member States to refrain from such con-
duct.77
Although quarantine – and more in general individual containment measures – represent anything but a
long-established States’ practice in reaction to the spread of infectious diseases,78 and to a certain extent they
are still permissible,79 it must be noted that they represent a violation of human rights of the persons whose
freedom of movement is restricted. Derogations from the respect of human rights are permitted under the
ICCPR and regional human rights treaties, but they must be justified by strict necessity.80 In the vast majority
of the above-mentioned cases, however, WHO has repeatedly recommended not to adopt quarantine measures
as they were superfluous, hence not necessary. This happened during both the H1N1 swine flus crisis81 and
the Ebola epidemic.82
The adoption and enforcement of containment measures and quarantine despite WHO recommendations
to the contrary clearly show States’ tendency to violate Art. 2 and Art. 43 of the IHR. The formal justifications
that the concerned States put forward in relation to their conducts loosely hide the “real” reasons why they
constantly disregard the obligation contained in the IHR: little trust in each other and in WHO recommended
measures. They also reveal a revival of protectionist arguments, especially concerning the need to give effective
answers to the population.83
Going back to the rationale of the ban on excessive measures it appears quite clearly that the widespread
practice of adopting and enforcing containment and quarantine measures contradicts all the three reasons that
pushed toward the inclusion of such a provision. The seriousness of such measures, in fact, is understandable
once we better appreciate, and recall, that they are violations of Art. 2 and Art. 43 of the IHR, which are specifi-
cally designed, as we saw in paragraph 3 of this article, to safeguard the countries hit by an epidemic, to induce
States to report the spread of new diseases and, finally, to reinforce the WHO’s coordinating role in managing
health crises. More in general, they are rules aimed at avoiding chaotic and unilateral reactions.
5 The (Non) existence of a statutory sanctioningmechanism inWHO’s rules
Surprisingly however, the seriousness of these violations does not correspond to an equally severe sanctioning
mechanism within WHO, the Organisation that should be coordinating the international response. Actually,
such a mechanism does not even exist.
It should firstly be pointed out that international organisations have little means to enforce their rules or
recommendations; in fact, they can impose sanctions on Member States by basically suspending their rights to
take part in the organisation’s activities.
As far as the WHO is concerned, Art. 7 of its Constitution provides for the adoption of sanctions when the
Organisation’s Member States do not honour their financial obligations. The same article also allows WHO to
adopt sanctions «in other exceptional circumstances». This expression was at the centre of an intense debate
about whether or not Art. 7 was adequate to allow the Organisation to sanction its Member States for violating
general international law rules. In this regard, practice exists, as the WHAdiscussed the possibility of sanction-
ing Portugal for having supported apartheid politics in Angola. It had to be decided if Art. 7 of WHO’s Consti-
tution could be considered a valid, legal foundation for WHO to sanction its own Member States for serious
human rights violations. At outset of the debate, the WHA grounded in Art. 7 the exclusion of Portugal from
the regional activity of theWHO in Africa.84 Therefore, as of now, it seems that serious human rights violations
represent the only exception to adopting sanctions on Member States for violating financial obligations.
Moving on to the specifics of the IHR (2005), we should refer back to Art. 56, para. 5, which reads: «in the
event of a dispute betweenWHO and one or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of
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these Regulations, the matter shall be submitted to the Health Assembly». It seems that this norm could pave
the way towards a mechanism, albeit rather primitive, of settling disputes,85 which would make resorting to
countermeasures both redundant and illegitimate. This same norm’s clauses leading up to the fifth, state that in
the case of disputes between WHO’s Member States, they can refer the question to the Organisation’s Director
General or put it forward for arbitration.86 We will come back to this possibility later, in paragraph 9.
We should, however, add some comments, here. The formula included inArt. 56, para. 5 of the IHRmay even
have been designed for this purpose. However, there is no practice that confirms its suitability for addressing
disputes arising from the adoption of excessive measures. So, it is not clear how adequate the mechanism is to
actually induce a State to end its illicit behaviour. On the other hand, States could – but they are not obliged
to – report to the Director General the existence of a dispute about how the IHR are applied, so we should
remember that they are under no obligation and could, in fact, proceed quite differently.
This is the end of the overview of possible sanctioning tools available to WHO.
It is clear that neither Art. 7 of the WHO Constitution nor Art. 56 of the IHR allow the Organisation to
effectively act against the violations of health regulations that we have mentioned so far. The inexistence of a
sanctioning mechanism available to WHO in order to keep states’ activities in check is a reality. Nevertheless,
it does not look like the Organisation is planning to propose statutory changes to rectify the situation. Further
proof of this is in the absence of a “sanctioning problem” in the Organisation’s governance’s reform plans.87
WHO's action seems to be inspired by a different rationale, based on the politics of creating incentives
for States to respect the IHR and the Organisation’s recommendations; a method that Alvarez described as
“managerial” and inspired by a “carrot & stick” policy.88 This is not necessarily negative. If WHO was able to
get Countries to respect the IHRwithout having to resort to sanctions or countermeasures, it would be carrying
out its duties. In fact, respecting the Organisation’s rules is not necessarily connected to the threat of a sanction
or, as in the case of this paper, a countermeasure. As Hart put it, respect for international law obligations does
not necessarily depend on a “gunman situation”, but on the persuasion that they are socially necessary and
acceptable.89 Indeed, the force deriving from social “blame and shame” should be sufficient to induce respect
for international standards imposed by international organizations.90
However, this approach is not satisfactory nowadays, or, at least, it does not seem to yield results.91 The
percentage of WHOMember States that have adjusted their own standards to IHR is still too low92 and, as we
saw earlier, imposing excessively restrictive measures on countries hit by epidemics in violation of Art. 43 is
continuous.
It is no coincidence that under the previously mentioned resolution 2177, the UNSC turned to Chapter
VII of the UN Charter to remind states to observe the IHR when managing the Ebola crisis.93 Although the
rapprochement between the maintenance of peace and security and the management of health crises has been
generally welcomed,94 the practice of the UNSC in this regard is inevitably a symptom of the weakness of the
strategies that WHO put in place to induce compliance with the IHR.95
At this point of the analysis the absence of a statutory sanctioning mechanism has been confirmed and, at
the same time, it is also demonstrated that such an absence is part of the endemic problem of compliance with
the IHR.
It is therefore useful to understand if general international law allowsWHO to end the IHR violations. In the
next paragraph, it will be questioned if the Organisation could (or intends to) resort to using countermeasure.
6 Exploring an alternative route: the adoption of countermeasures by international
organisations
As we mentioned in the introduction, it cannot be excluded the adoption of countermeasures by international
organisations. Caution is normally necessary when addressing this issue, but it is especially important when
the relationships between international organisations and their Member States are at stake.96
In fact, there do not seem to be compelling reasons to limit international organisations from resorting to
countermeasures in cases that fall outside the relationship with their Member States. As international organi-
sations increasingly enter international agreements with third parties, both with States or other international
organisations, they have a real interest in stopping violations that could be committed against them. It seems
just reasonable to admit that they can adopt any suitable measures to halt the violation of an obligation arising
from such relationships.97
In this regard, we cannot exclude either that international organisations can adopt countermeasures against
third parties for violating erga omnes obligations. A clear example were sanctions that the EU adopted as part of
its Common Security andDefence Policy regarding states involved in terrorist activities or those that committed
serious violations of international law.98
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As we said earlier, the relationship between international organisations and their Member States seems
more complex and this is, in fact, what this paper has set out to investigate. This relationship is at the centre of
a historic debate that is fraught with deep divisions and undoubtedly difficult to appease. In an attempt to sum
up the different doctrinal positions, some scholars believe that the relationships between international organi-
sations and their Member States are to be exclusively regulated by each organisation’s internal rules. Therefore,
it is impossible for countermeasures to be implemented in international organisations’ internal relationships
as they are not covered under the domain of international law.99
Other scholars, however, argue that international organisations and their Member States are autonomous
in their inter se relationships, which are governed by international law.100 Countermeasures would naturally
then be applicable to international relations that can exist between these two international law subjects.101 In
this regard, the adoption of countermeasures by international organisations in the relations between them and
their Member States proves that the formers are autonomous in respect of the latters.102
In addition to these theoretical problems, it must be observed that, in practice, international organisations
usually have few tools at their disposal that can classify as “countermeasures”. One of this could be the suspen-
sion of a faulting State’s right to vote. However, the effectiveness of this measure can be reasonably doubted.
Such concern is witnessed by the recent United States’ Government decision to suspend its UNESCO funding
because Palestine was accepted as a Member. In fact, even now, the Congress of the United States has still not
authorised UNESCO funding to start again despite its voting rights being suspended.103 On the other side,
Member States have more effective tools to induce international organizations to comply with their political
will.104 As an example, they persuade their organisations to adhere to international obligations by adopting
countermeasures against them: for example, suspending funding.105
The ILC has maintained a laic position on the issue of countermeasures, confirming that the rules concern-
ing international organisations’ responsibility – and thus the rules on countermeasures – can also be applied
to international organisations and Member States where these relationships are governed by international law.
In fact, Art. 10, paragraph 2 of the DARIO claims that an internationally wrongful act could result from the
violation «of an international obligation that may arise for an international organisation towards its members
under the rules of the organisation». Indeed, the Commentary to Art. 10 states that this provision «does not
attempt to express a clear-cut view on the issue. It simply intends to say that, to the extent that an obligation
arising from the rules of the organisation has to be regarded as an obligation under international law, the prin-
ciples expressed in the present article apply. Breaches of obligations under the rules of the organisation are not
as such breaches of obligations under international law».106
The DARIO, therefore, could be a good point to start in understanding the state of art in international law
regarding international organisations and countermeasures. Analysis must begin then with Art. 22, which dic-
tates the conditions for an international organisation to react with countermeasures against States and other
international organisations that are its Members or third parties. During discussions about this norm, debates
have long analysed the possibility that international organisations adopt countermeasures against their own
Members (whether they are States or other organisations) and vice versa. The ILC’s efforts led to draw up two
specular norms: Art. 22 and Art. 52, which respectively discipline the case of an international organisation
taking countermeasures against its ownMember States or when an international organisation has countermea-
sures placed against it.
Art. 22 is what interests us here and it is a complex norm that disciplines three situations: the international
organisation’s adoption of countermeasures against 1) third parties; 2) its ownMembers for violations of general
international law; 3) its own Members when they violate the rules of the organisation. In the first situation (1),
Art. 22 subordinates the countermeasures’ legality to the procedural and substantial conditions that can be
found in the specific part of the DARIO (4th part, Chapter II); they are closely aligned to those in the Articles
on the Responsibility of States for InternationallyWrongful Act (ARSIWA). In the second scenario (2), adopting
countermeasures is subordinate not only to the conditions cited above but also to the circumstances that they
are «not inconsistent with the rules of the organisation» and that there are not any internal remedies geared
to ceasing the illegal actions. In the last scenario (3), Art. 22 ban an international organisation to react with
countermeasures unless the rules of the organisation allow it.107
So, basically, the severity of the conditions for adopting a countermeasure is considered directly propor-
tional to the relationship between the international organisation and the subject that has had countermeasures
imposed on it. To put it simple, the more the organisation is tied with the “targeted” subject, the more the
conditions for adopting countermeasures are demanding.
This conclusion should not surprise: Art. 22 of the DARIO was designed to carefully consider the «special
ties existing between an international organisation and its members».108 As one Author put it, the DARIO
seem to let the regulation of countermeasures to the rules of the organisations.109 So, the default rule depends
on the leges speciales of each organisation. At the very end, the ILC’s approach to countermeasures seems to
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accommodate the criticism based on the unacceptability of the very idea that a State can adopt countermeasures
against an international organisation that it is a Member of and vice versa.
The most extreme scenario – the third one, mentioned before – demonstrates this, by allowing the recourse
to countermeasures for violations of the rules of the organisation only if the same rules so provide. Therefore,
it is of a paramount importance to ascertain which obligation is violated, as from this evaluation depends the
choice of the regime that governs the adoption of countermeasures.
However, such a determination is not an easy one.
7 CanWHOadopt countermeasures against its ownMember States if they violate
the 2005 InternationalHealthRegulations?
It is now possible to apply the results of the analysis performed in the previous paragraph to the special case of
the WHO. It is crucial to look closely at this Organisation in order to understand which regime – among those
mentioned in Art. 22 – governs the adoption of countermeasures.
First of all, it is necessary to point out – as we did earlier110 – that its nearly universal membership makes
any reasoning about adopting countermeasures against non-member States or international organisations of
no practical use. However, WHO could certainly adopt measures aimed at stopping violations of international
law committed by other international organisations, although this paper cannot analyse all the conditions that
these measures would be subordinated to. It rouses our interest, though, to reason about WHO’s qualification
as injured party and how it would demonstrate this in order to resort to countermeasures. Such a qualification
could derive from the violation of any norm deriving from the various partnership agreements that WHO has
with international organisations. WHO, however, could also consider itself injured if erga omnes obligations
were violated, including health protection.111 In this case, nothing would appear to stopWHO from approach-
ing a State or international organisation in order to make them respect their obligations on the matter,112 which
in fact has already happened in other international organisations.113
As far as the relationships between WHO and its Member States are concerned, Art. 22 of the DARIO re-
quires a closer inspection at the rules of the organisation in order to find out if there is a ban on reacting with
countermeasures and/or ifWHO is explicitly allowed to react with countermeasures against itsMember States.
An analysis of the WHO Constitution shows no norm banning the adoption of countermeasures or a norm
explicitly giving WHO this authority. As we already saw, Art. 7 only considers the possibility for the organ-
isation to sanction the States that do not respect their financial obligations and, in certain cases, where they
are responsible for serious violations of fundamental rights. It is necessary then to investigate the existence of
norms – different from the sanctioning mechanism established in Art. 7 – that entitle the WHO to react against
its own Member States.
There is an interesting provision to this end in the Constitution of the Organisation that allows for theWHO
Assembly to adopt «any other appropriate action to further the objective of the Organisation» (Art. 18, Letter
M). This disposition apparently gives WHO sufficiently wide-ranging powers which would allow it to adopt
countermeasures, although the practice demonstrates that such powers have been used through time for other
reasons.
In fact, looking at the WHA’s practice we notice that it has extended the organisation’s competences, fre-
quently forcingMember States’ to approval. It is interesting tomention, in this regard, the outcome of a research
project on the delegation of power to international organisations, which indicates that the WHO is a clear ex-
ample of the predominance of the technical components – particularly within the Secretariat – that has often
pushed the political organs to expand the competence of the organisation.114 This tendency, however, does not
seem to prove much as it can be justified by the implicit powers that any international organisations can resort
to.115
Amore specific and interesting practice is linked to the management of the 2003 SARS (Severe Acute Respi-
ratory Syndrome) epidemic, which spread up two years before the conclusion of the IHR revision process. In
that period, the 1969 version of the IHR was still in force. SARS had not been included in that formulation of
the IHR, which, it is worth recalling, was applicable only to a certain, and specified, number of diseases. The
regulations, therefore, were not applicable and, in theory, WHO was not competent to act as a coordinator of
the international response to the disease. This notwithstanding, WHO recommended not travelling to States
that had been hit by the flu, which were – among the others –Hong Kong and the Chinese province of Guang-
dong. TheWHO issued such a recommendation even though it had not reached any prior agreementwith these
Countries; it grounded its action on the necessity to cope with the rapid evolution of the epidemic116 that was
expanding to a growing number of areas.117 This recommendation was the first of this kind in WHO’s history
and it represented a courageous attitude of the Organisation towards the prerogatives of States’ sovereignty.
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Such an attitude can be credited with creating a partnership between the organisation and the States’ govern-
ments involved in the epidemic. The Chinese were the most involved and the network aimed at facilitating the
flow of information and therefore contain the epidemic as much as possible.
This practice is certainly interesting and proof that WHO enjoys a certain margin of discretion in its actions
and it could be autonomous in the adoption of measures and recommendations against its Member States that
are not included in the rules of the organisation, but useful to reach its own objectives. However, the actions that
the WHO performed against the will of its Member States does not qualify as countermeasures or sanctions,
as it has not been recognised as being in violation of any of the Organisation’s obligations owed to its Member
States and because the acts are frequently not binding.
Moving to the regime created by the 2005 IHR, theWHO seems to be edging towards adopting measures as
a reaction toMember States violating the IHR. In fact, someAuthorsmaintain that Art. 43 that obliges countries
to not adopt unnecessary, restrictive measures allows WHO to “name and shame” Member States that do not
follow the dictates of the norm.118 So basically, paragraph 3 of Art. 43 obliges WHO to publish the necessary
information119 concerning the measures that the concerned States adopt. Paragraph 4 gives WHO the power
to ask for those measures120 to cease, but the norm does not go further and this reflects the organisation’s
approach that has never adopted measures against the numerous states that have violated Art. 43.
In conclusion, the rules of the WHO – enclosed in both the Constitution and the IHR – seem to be silent on
the issue of countermeasure: neither they explicitly allow, nor they ban the adoption of countermeasures on the
part of the Organisation. If we tried to apply Art. 22 of the project toWHO,wewould then determine thatWHO
cannot adopt countermeasures against its own Member States for violation of the rules of the organisation. It
could, though, abstractly adopt countermeasures against Member States if they violated general international
law rules.
It is crucial, then, to understand if violating the Art. 43 IHR would qualify as violations of the rules of
the organisation or not because, as we saw earlier, the applicable regime on the adoption of countermeasures
is radically different. In this regard, we already anticipated in paragraph two of this article that the nature
of the IHR – including earlier versions – is unusual, but that it is impossible to deny that the IHR fall under
the category of the rules of the organisations. Consequently, as Art. 22 DARIO dictates, the WHO may adopt
countermeasures for sanctioning violations of the IHR by its Member States only insofar as the rules of the
organisation so provide.
However, this is not the case.
8 CanWHOmember states adopt countermeasures against each other?
The above conclusion suggests we should move the investigation from the rules concerning international or-
ganisations’ responsibility to those concerning States’ responsibility. In concrete terms, the combination of the
rigidity of Art. 22 and the WHO internal rules, that make it difficult for it to adopt countermeasures, seem to
lead towards another option: the adoption of countermeasures by WHO's Member States following IHR vio-
lations. In other words, as WHO lacks suitable regulations for determining resort to countermeasures, could it
be for its Member States to react to a violation of the IHR?
One may wonder whether WHO’s Member States are allowed to resort to countermeasures in their inter
se relationships to react to violations of the IHR as foreseen in the ARSIWA.121 Such a hypothesis seems to be
justified by the IHR’s dual nature as both rules of the organisation and treaty obligations.122 It is reasonable
to maintain, in fact, that they do not only create States’ obligations towards the WHO, but also – and maybe
especially – obligations that limit Member States in their reciprocal relationships.123
The theoretical background of this question can be traced back in the well-known debate on self-contained
regimes, namely regimes that contains special rules on responsibility excluding the application of general inter-
national law.124 Recourse to countermeasures between Member States of an international organisation, in fact,
implies that there are no available means to resolve the dispute in the law of that international organisation or
that the means are not effective. As seen above, Art. 56, para. 5 of the IHR establishes a rather primitive reso-
lution mechanisms for disputes between the WHO and its Member States. However, no similar mechanisms is
established in the relationships betweenWHO’s Member States. As anticipated in paragraph five of this article,
paragraphs from 1 to 4 of Art. 56, in fact, simply suggest the involvement of the WHODirector General, but do
not envisage any mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms.125 All the more, Art. 56, par. 4 indicates that:
«Nothing in these Regulations shall impair the rights of States Parties under any international agreement
to which they may be parties to resort to the dispute settlement mechanisms of other intergovernmental
organizations or established under any international agreement.»
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It appears clearly that there are neither the WHO Constitution, nor the IHR can be labelled as self-contained
regimes, as no dispute resolutions mechanisms are foreseen.
However, Art. 56, par. 4 of the IHR suggests that this might not be the only regime to consider. Indeed, States
affected by restrictive trade measures adopted and enforced in violation of Art. 43 of the IHR brought the issue
before the WTO, which hosted a debate on the matter, as we already saw in paragraph four of this article.
The debate, therefore, shifts from the WHO rules to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the
WTO, which, in Art. 23, establishes a sort of primacy of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism.126 Resort to
countermeasure would therefore be limited if not prohibited by the dispute resolution mechanism established
in the “WTO regime”.127 Some Authors, however, maintain that a fall-back to general international law would
be permissible in cases where the WTO dispute resolution mechanism proves to be ineffective, as an ultima
ratio.128
Looking at the practice, in a joint statement by Trade Ministers of United States, Mexico and Canada issued
on the 7 of May 2009 appears a clear intention to adopt retaliation measures:
«[…] we urge our trading partners to remove these restrictions on our products immediately. We will
continue to follow this situation closely, and will take any steps to prevent the enforcement of unjustified mea-
sures against our exports, as appropriate»129 (emphasis added)
Countermeasures were not adopted, but during the debate hosted by the WTO, States that had implemented
restrictive measures were called to provide justification for their actions. As a consequence, China justified130
the ban on importing pork meat on the basis of Art. 5.7 of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) that allows States to «provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary
measures».131
It is interesting to note that the States that lamented trade restrictions or bans characterized them as viola-
tions of international law rules other than the IHR, in particular rules related to trade agreements. At the same
time, even the justification adduced by the States responsible of the violations were not based on the IHR or on
theWHO’s recommended standards. In otherwords, this seems to prove that States does not consider theWHO
as a system capable of solving disputes among them. They disregard the fact that such restrictions amount to
violations of the IHR or, at least, to disagreement on the interpretation of them that could be addressed in the
terms of Art. 56 of the IHR. It appears, therefore, that States do not consider this mechanism as an option and
would prefer, as the joint statement issued by United States, Mexico and Canada demonstrates, to engage the
States that imposed restrictive measures on the field of other regimes or, in ultima ratio, resorting to general
international law.
This hypothesis should not be underestimated and it might be considered as a solution for ensuring com-
pliance with the IHR. However, it runs the risk of threatening the impact of WHO’s actions as it would damage
the delicate balance between what distinguishes the relationship between international organisations and its
Member States and what acts as a guarantee of autonomy for the former compared to the latter. In other words,
the “institutional veil” of the WHO will inevitably end up being pierced.132
Another reason for adopting a cautious attitude regarding this hypothesis is the following: it would imply an
acceptance of theWHO inability to ensure that its own regulations are respected, evenwhen they are confirmed
by recommendations. States would over-ride the organisation, either because it is inadequate – in this case
because of its sanctioning system – or probably because there is a lack of trust.133 Indeed,whenChinawas called
to justify the trade restrictions it stated that it: «was aware of the concerns on the issue and was actively seeking
additional information for amore objective assessment of the risk».134 The fact that aMember States of theWHO
seeks for additional information for a more objective assessment of the risk after four international organisations – the
WHO among them – explicitly affirmed that there was no such a risk, appears as a blunt evidence of mistrust
in the international organisation that should be recognized as the orchestrator of the international response to
epidemics.
9 Conclusions
Most of the doubts that have emerged in this article have received a negative response. It has been confirmed that
there is a problem caused by persistent violations of the IHR andWHO’s subsequent inability to find a remedy.
It also came to light that the current state of evolution in the law of international responsibility admits that
international organisations can resort to countermeasures against their ownMembers in only really exceptional
cases.
Art. 22 ofDARIO certainly appears to be a rigid normbecause it greatly limits an international organisation’s
chances of resorting to countermeasures. The cautions that limit the adoption of countermeasures on the part
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of the international organisations when their Member States violate the rules of the organisation appear to be
designed for sophisticated organisations with their own systems of sanctioning and dispute settlement.
It could be argued that this caution represents progressive development and not codification of interna-
tional law on this point.135 If this were the case, a more elastic regulation might be useful to better address the
peculiarity of those international organisations that do not have sanctioning powers, likeWHO, butmight need
to resort to countermeasures to induce States to comply with the standards they contribute to set.
But WHO seems to oppose this interpretation. In a comment sent to the ILC during its 61st session,  the
WHO highlighted that the adoption of countermeasures should have been read in the light of the “privileged”
position enjoyed by an international organisation’s Member States.136 Indeed, as we saw earlier137 there is a
clear lack of effectiveness of the measures that an international organisation could adopt against its Member
States compared to those that the latter could adopt against the former.
The ineffectiveness of such measures pairs with the risk that their adoption would likely bring the interna-
tional organisations to violate their own mandates. It is again the WHO, in the comments sent to the ILC, to
stress that: «[t]he suspension by the organisation concerned of its activities […] would negatively affect the inter-
ests of the beneficiaries of those activities» and therefore contradict the spirit of the rules of the organisation.138
It is quite telling that such a comment derives from the WHO. Among the wide panorama of international or-
ganisations, it is one of the fewest that elaborate standards the respect of which is demanded toMember States.
Against this, one would have probably expected another attitude of the WHO towards the formulation of the
DARIO’s rules on countermeasures.
As this is not happened, it is reasonable to conclude that the evolution of international law regarding the
adoption of countermeasures by international organisations perfectly reflects the political will of the same in-
ternational organisations and of their Member States; in other words, it seems to reflect practice and opinion
juris. The codification efforts of the ILC on the responsibility of international organisations has led to the elab-
oration of strict and demanding conditions for the adoption of countermeasures, which are objectively difficult
to satisfy. WHO’s attitude seems to confirm that the direction the ILC took corresponds to the state of the art.
The relationship between international organisations and their Member States is disciplined by the rules of the
organisations and resort to countermeasure makes no exception.
The lack of compliancewith the 2005 IHR, therefore, can only be tackled and solved byWHO’sMember State
through an expansion of theOrganisation’s powers or competence leading to the establishment of a sanctioning
mechanism.139 It seems obvious, however, that States looks reluctant about the idea of giving WHO new and
greater powers, maybe even institutionalising resorting to countermeasures. On the other side, WHO does not
seem to push too much for a similar reform. This is evident by the absence of this issue in the organisation’s
governance reform proposal – as we mentioned earlier.140
There seems to be a sort of implicit “non-aggression pact” in force between theWHO and itsMember States.
The terms of this “pact” are emblematically summarized in a speech delivered by the then Director General
Halfdan Mahler in 1983. This speech was made during the phase described previously141 where WHO was
under pressure from its own technical board, which had persuaded the WHA to extend its authority, albeit
excessively:
«[i]f we allow ourselves to be lured astray into fields beyond our constitutional competences I am afraid
we will find ourselves in those very minefields that we have trying to avoid in the interest first and
foremost of the deprived peoples living in the Third World. None of us would want to blow up our
Organisation, nor would we want to lose the tremendous prestige we have gained as an Organisation
of 160 Member States, able to cooperate with one another for the health of people everywhere without
distinction of race, religion, political beliefs, social or economic development – indeed, what our very
Constitution demands of us»142
Normally such reasoning is justified by referring to international organisations that have limited mandates or
powers to act. In such cases, Members States can control the organisations' conduct through the rules of the
organisations that normally discipline its powers very carefully.143 The level of detail that characterizes the
conferral of powers to this kind of organisations leaves little space for discussing an extension of the organisa-
tions’ powers. Although this model simply reflects an extreme interpretation of functionalism, it is influenced
by a clear political choice of Member States not to leave to international organisations room for increasing their
powers.144
However, as we explained in the introduction,145 WHO is not an organisation with limited powers. In fact,
it has the competence to adopt rules and standard that its Member States are bound to respect; moreover, as
seen above, it sometimes acted with a high degree of autonomy, in particular in the period that preceded the
negotiation of the 2005 IHR.146 Indeed, themandatory character of the IHR, both the actual version and the ear-
lier ones, reflects an “anti-contractualist” attitude of the WHO towards its Member States.147 Potentially, then,
WHO would need to be tenacious when following its own mandate, which might include creating dialogue
12
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with its Member States. In this last case, WHO should be able to make the States respect certain standards of
conduct, regardless of their desire to do so or not.
But this does not happen and this inertia is helped by reading and analysing the rules on countermeasures
in the DARIO. It is also helped by the behaviour of Member States, which label the violations of the IHR as vio-
lations of rules of general international law, or treaties other than then those concludedwithinWHO, and seem
tempted to activate dispute resolution mechanisms elsewhere or, in ultima ratio, to resort to countermeasures
in their inter se relationship.148
In a recent piece, JanKlabbers concludes that the law of international organisations is fundamentally conser-
vative. It is more geared to protecting the organisations than efficiently regulating their activities and helping
solve their problems.149 This reflectionwas developed by looking at the relationships between the organisations
and third parties, but the case made in this article shows how it can also be applied to relationships between
the organisations and their Member States.
Whereas this might help to avoid the “great escape” of States from international organisations, it is hardly
useful for giving the latter enough means to pursue their mandates.
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17See José E. Alvarez, The Impact of International Organizations on International Law(Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2016),
196–197.
18WHO Constitution, Art. 2: «In order to achieve its objective, the functions of the Organisation shall be: (a) to act as the directing and
co-ordinating authority on international health work; (b) to establish andmaintain effective collaboration with the United Nations, special-
ized agencies, governmental health administrations, professional groups and such other organisations as may be deemed appropriate; (c)
to assist Governments, upon request, in strengthening health services; (d) to furnish appropriate technical assistance and, in emergencies,
necessary aid upon the request or acceptance of Governments; (e) to provide or assist in providing, upon the request of the United Nations,
health services and facilities to special groups, such as the peoples of trust territories; (f ) to establish andmaintain such administrative and
technical services as may be required, including epidemiological and statistical services; (g) to stimulate and advance work to eradicate
epidemic, endemic another diseases; (h) to promote, in co-operation with other specialized agencies where necessary, the prevention of
accidental injuries; (i) to promote, in co-operation with other specialized agencies where necessary, the improvement of nutrition, housing,
sanitation, recreation, economic or working conditions and other aspects of environmental hygiene; (j) to promote co-operation among
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scientific and professional groups which contribute to the advancement of health; (k) to propose conventions, agreements and regulations,
and make recommendations with respect to international health matters and to perform such duties as may be assigned thereby to the
Organisation and are consistent with its objective; (l) to promote maternal and child health and welfare and to foster the ability to live har-
moniously in a changing total environment; (m) to foster activities in the field of mental health, especially those affecting the harmony of
human relations; (n) to promote and conduct research in the field of health; (o) to promote improved standards of teaching and training in
the health, medical and related professions; (p) to study and report on, in co-operationwith other specialized agencies where necessary, ad-
ministrative and social techniques affecting public health and medical care from preventive and curative points of view, including hospital
services and social security; (q) to provide information, counsel and assistance in the field of health; (r) to assist in developing an informed
public opinion among all peoples on matters of health; (s) to establish and revise as necessary international nomenclatures of diseases, of
causes of death and of public health practices; (t) to standardize diagnostic procedures as necessary; (u) to develop, establish and promote
international standards with respect to food, biological, pharmaceutical and similar products; (v) generally to take all necessary action to
attain the objective of the Organisation».
19See David P. Fidler, “Caught Between Paradise and Power: Public Health, Pathogenic Threats, and the Axis of Illness”, McGeorge Law
Review (2005): 64–67.
20Tine Hanrieder, “WHO orchestrates? Coping with competitors in global health”, in International Organizations as Orchestrators, ed.
Kenneth W. Abbott et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 191 ff., 196–197.
21WHO Constitution, Preamble: «The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every
human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition». See Fidler, “Caught Between Paradise and
Power: Public Health, Pathogenic Threats, and the Axis of Illness”, 71, who describes with the expression «holistic strategy» the role of the
WHO in the promotion of the right to health.
22Nadja Meisterhans, “The World Health Organization in Crisis – Lessons to be Learned Beyond the Ebola Outbreak”, in The Chinese
Journal of Global Governance 2, no. 1 (2016): 25.
23See accordinglyAlbertoOddenino, “Profili internazionali ed europei del diritto alla salute”, in Salute e sanità, ed. Rosario Ferrara (Milan:
Giuffré, 2010), 129. The idea that the WHO can be regarded as an international organisation capable of imposing standard even before the
entry into force of the 2005 IHR is shared by Felice Morgenstern, Legal Problems of International Organisations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), 91 ff and Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 58–59.
24WHO Constitution, art. 21: «The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning: (a) sanitary and quarantine
requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease; (b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases,
causes of death and public health practices; (c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use; (d) standards with re-
spect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical and similar productsmoving in international commerce; (e) advertising
and labelling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce».
25WHO Constitution, art. 22: «Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into force for all Members after due notice has been
given of their adoption by the Health Assembly except for such Members as may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservations
within the period stated in the notice».
26See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Le pouvoir réglementaire de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé à l’aune de la santémondiale:
réflexions sur la portée et la nature du Règlement sanitaire international de 2005”, inDroit du pouvoir, pouvoir du droit: mélanges offerts à Jean
Salmon (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007), 1157 ff. On the sui generis nature of the IHR see also Schermers, Blokker, International Institutional Law,
795, para. 1265; Roberto Virzo, “The Proliferation of International Acts of International Organisations. A Proposal for Their Classification”,
in (Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2015), 311–313. On this issue see infra para. 7.
27WHO, Resolution n. WHA58.3, Revision of the International Health Regulations, of 23 of May 2015. The first paragraph of the resolution
mention expressly: «[TheWorld Health Assembly] ADOPTS the revised International Health Regulations attached to this resolution, to be
referred to as the “International Health Regulations (2005)”».
28Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations (Vienna, 21May
1986), not yet in force, text available in Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organisations or between International Organisations, vol. II (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.V.5), art. 2, j).
29IHR, art. 59.
30Ibid., art. 66.
31Ibid., art. 64.
32Ibid., art. 62.
33See accordingly Virzo, “The Proliferation of International Acts of International Organisations. A Proposal for their Classification”, 312.
34On this issue, literature is almost unanimous; see inter alia Boisson des Chazournes, “Le pouvoir réglementaire de l’Organisation mon-
diale de la santé à l’aune de la santémondiale: réflexions sur la portée et la nature du Règlement sanitaire international de 2005”, 1165–1168;
Michéle Poulain, “Le règlement sanitaire de l’OMS”, in Droit des organisations internationales, ed. Evelyn Lagrange, Jean-Marc Sorel (Paris:
LGDJ, 2013), 761; Virzo, “The Proliferation of International Acts of International Organisations. A Proposal for their Classification”, 312.
35IHR, art. 1.1.
36See accordinglyGian Luca Burci, “InstitutionalAdaptationwithout Reform:WHOand theChallenges toGlobalization”, in International
Organisations Law Review 2, no. 2 (2005): 437–443.
37David P. Fidler, “Revision of the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations”, in ASIL Insights of 16 April 2004,
available at www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/8/revision-world-health-organizations-international-health-regulations.
38IHR, art. 4.
39Ibid., art. 5 and 6.
40Ibid., art. 7.
41Ibid., art. 13.
42See Pia Acconci, Tutela della salute e diritto internazionale, (Padua: CEDAM, 2011), 170–171.
43IHR, art. 10.
44Ibid., art. 12. As of now, the WHO has declared has declare four Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC): in 2009, due
to the spread of the virus H1N1, the “swine flu”; in 2014 twice, for poliomyelitis and for tackling the spread of virus Ebola; lastly, in 2016,
for Zika. All the information related to the past and future declaration of PHEIC can be found on the website of theWHO at www.who.int.
45IHRIHR, art. 15.
46Gian Luca Burci, Claude H. Vignes,World Health Organisation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 44, para. 56.
47IHR, art. 2.
48See again David P. Fidler, “Revision of the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations”.
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49David P. Fidler, Lawrence O. Gostin, “The New International Health Regulations: An Historic Development for International Law and
Public Health”, in The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34, no. 1 (Spring, 2006): 86. More in general, the purpose of theWHO is to elaborate
rules and standards that do not affect commercial relations between States and do not infringe the freedom of movement of their citizens:
see Edoardo Greppi, “Organizzazione mondiale della sanità (O.M.S.)”, in Novissimo Digesto Italiano (1984), 19.
50IHR, art. 43.
51Ibid., art. 43, para. 1: «These regulations shall not preclude State parties from implementing health measures in accordance with their
relevant national law and obligations under international law, in response to specific public health risks or public health emergencies of
international concern, which: (a) achieve the same or greater level of health protection than WHO recommendations».
52Ibid.: «Such measures shall not be more restrictive of international traffic and not more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably
available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health protection».
53The expression “counter-limits” is mainly used in the relationship between different legal orders or in the dialogue between inter-
national and national courts on the protection of human rights. For an overview see Giuseppe Martinico, “Is the European Convention
Going to Be ‘Supreme’? A Comparative-Constitutional Overview of ECHR and EU Law before National Courts”, in European Journal of
International Law 23, no. 2 (2012): 401 ff., at 419.
54United Nations General Assembly Resolution 69/1, UN Doc. A/RES/69/1 of 23 September 2014.
55«Flight cancellations and other travel restrictions continue to isolate affected countries resulting in detrimental economic consequences,
and hinder relief and response efforts risking further international spread of the disease»: WHO, Statement on the 2nd meeting of the IHR
Emergency Committee regarding the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, 22 September 2014, available at www.who.int/mediacentre/news/s-
tatements/2014/ebola-2nd-ihr-meeting/en/. See also a UnitedNations press release issued on the 25 August 2014: Flight restrictions hamper
ability to battle Ebola, UN cautions, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48555#.WYCiioiLR9A.
56See accordingly Jennifer Shkabatur, “AGlobal Panopticon – The Changing Role of International Organisations in the InformationAge”,
inMichigan Journal of International Law 33, no. 2 (2011): 171.
57Again Acconci, Tutela della salute e diritto internazionale, 171.
58See accordingly Poulain, “Le règlement sanitaire de l’OMS”, 757.
59Sarah E. Davies et al,Disease Diplomacy. International Norms and Global Health Security (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2015),
40–41.
60Hanrieder, “WHO orchestrates? Coping with competitors in global health”, 191.
61See again Sarooshi, International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers, 60.
62See accordingly Adam Kamradt-Scott, “Who, Global Health Security & International Law”, in Legal Perspective on Security Institutions,
ed. Hitoshi Nasu, Kim Rubenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 244.
63The comment provided by the Swiss Government is available at www.who.int/ihr/revisionprocess/swissIHR.pdf.
64Sarah E. Davies et al.,Disease Diplomacy. International Norms and Global Health Security, 128. According to these Authors, States are more
and more convinced that imposing excessive measures is convenient to them, even if it causes a violation of Art. 43 of the IHR. Such an
attitude seems to prove that States do not trust the capacity of the WHO to manage health crises. On this specific issue, we will come back
later in this paragraph.
65Joint FAO/WHO/OIE Statement on influenza A(H1N1) and the safety of pork, 7 May 2009, available at http://www.who.int/mediacen-
tre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090430/en/.
66See broadly on this issue: RebeccaKatz, Julie Fischer, “TheRevised InternationalHealthRegulations:AFramework forGlobal Pandemic
Governance”, in Global Health Governance 3, no. 2 (2010): 1–18.
67WHO, Swine flu illness in the United States and Mexico – update 2, 26 April 2009, available at www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_26/en/.
68Joint FAO, OIE, WHO and WTO statement on A/H1N1 virus, 2 May 2009, available at www.fao.org/news/story/it/item/19349/icode/.
69WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005). Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International
Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, para. 40.
70Such arguments were raised by the Chinese government in the WTO, in the context of a debate entirely devoted to discuss technical
aspects of the reactions of States to the “swine flu”. SeeWTO (Committee on Sanitary and PhytosanitaryMeasures), Specific Trade Concerns.
Note by the Secretariat. Addendum. Issues not considered in 2010, G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.2 of 1 March 2011, p. 4, para. 13.
71Ibid., para. 12.
72The declaration of the Ghanese government is paradigmatic: «most of these countries did not have the capacity to do a proper risk
analysis of the pandemic» (ibid., p. 5, para. 20). It appears clearly that the restrictions were adopted because States were convinced of the
fact that the spread of the virus could not have been prevented otherwise.
73See broadly on this Wedny E. Parmet, Public Health & Social Control: Implications for Human Rights, The International Council on Human
Rights Policy, Project on Social Control andHumanRights Research Paper (Final Draft), available at www.ichrp.org/files/papers/173/pub-
lic_health_and_social_control_wendy_parmet.pdf.
74See Austin Ramzy, “China and Swine Flu: Are Mexicans Being Singled Out?”, Time, 4 May 2009 available at: content.time.com/time/-
world/article/0,8599,1895659,00.html.
75ForeignMinistry SpokespersonMa Zhaoxu’s Remarks onMexican Officials Accusing China of Discrimination for PlacingMexican Citizens under
Quarantine, 4 May 2009, available at: it.china-embassy.org/ita/fyrth/t560379.htm.
76As concerns the peculiarity of the Canada case, see Michelle Hayman, “Fear Above Science: Canada’s Ebola Related Visa Restrictions”,
published on the blog of the Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto and available on the website: ihrp.law.utoronto.ca.
77Security Council, resolution 2177 of 18 September 2014, para. 4: «The Security Council […] Calls on Member States, including of the
region, to lift general travel and border restrictions, imposed as a result of the Ebola outbreak, and that contribute to the further isolation
of the affected countries and undermine their efforts to respond to the Ebola outbreak and also calls on airlines and shipping companies
to maintain trade and transport links with the affected countries and the wider region».
78See on this Andreas Schloenhardt, “From Black Death to Bird Flu: Infectious Diseases and Immigration Restrictions in Asia”, in New
England Journal of International and Comparative Law 23, no. 1, (Spring 2006): 263 ff.
79Even the WHO does not exclude the permissibility of quarantine measures, see WHO, Addressing ethical issues in pandemic influenza
planning. Discussion Papers, WHO/HSE/EPR/GIP/2008.2 and WHO/IER/ETH/2008.1, available at www.who.int/csr/resources/publi-
cations/cds_flu_ethics_5web.pdf .
80UNCommission onHuman Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 of 28 September 1984, Art. 62.
81WHO, Global Alert and Response, Travel, 7 May 2009, available at www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/-
travel/en/index.html.
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82WHO, Statement on travel and transport in relation to Ebola virus disease outbreak, 18 August 2014, available at www.who.int/mediacen-
tre/news/statements/2014/ebola-travel-trasport/en/.
83Sarah E. Davies et al, Disease Diplomacy. International Norms and Global Health Security, 133–134. A stimulating insight on the reasons
that push States to adopt restrictive measures can be found in William A. Kerr, “Political Precaution, Pandemics and Protectionism”, in
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 10, no. 1, (2009): 1–14, particularly at 9. Id., Conflict, Chaos and Confusion. The Crisis
in the International Trading System (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), Chapter 19.
84WHO, Resolution n. WHA 19.31 of 18 May 1966. See more extensively on this Picchio Forlati, La sanzione nel diritto internazionale, 295.
85Gian Luca Burci, Clemens Feinäugle, “The ILC’s Articles Seen from aWHO Perspective”, in Responsibility of International Organisations.
Essays in Honour of Sir Ian Brownlie, ed. Maurizio Ragazzi (Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 187.
86IHR, art. 56, para. 2 and 3.
87WHO,WHO reform: overview of reform implementation Report by the Director-General, A68/4 of 8 May 2015.
88Alvarez, The Impact of International Organizations on International Law, 225.
89Herbert L.A.Hart,TheConcept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1961), 85–91, particularly p. 85: «it is clear that obligation
is not to be found in the gunman situation»). Recently this doctrinal position has been adversed by Frederick Schauer, The Force of Law
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 2015).
90See accordingly Abram Chayes, Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereingnty. Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Boston:
Harvard University Press, 1995), 151 and 232–233; Oran Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Criti-
cal Variables”, in Governance without Governments: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James Rosenau, Ernst O. Czempiel (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 176–177.
91See again Alvarez, The Impact of International Organizations on International Law, 225 and Shkabatur, “AGlobal Panopticon – The Chang-
ing Role of International Organizations in the Information Age”, 172.
92WHO, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005), p. 129, para. 12: «Despite these positive features of the IHR, many
States Parties lack core capacities to detect, assess and report potential health threats and are not on a path to complete their obligations
for plans and infrastructure by the 2012 deadline specified in the IHR. Continuing on the current trajectory will not enable countries to
develop these capacities and fully implement the IHR. Of the 194 States Parties, 128, or 66 %, responded to a recent WHO questionnaire
on their progress. Only 58 % of the respondents reported having developed national plans to meet core capacity requirements, and as few
as 10 % of reporting countries indicated that they had fully established the capacities envisaged by the IHR. Further, as documented by
external studies and aWHOquestionnaire, in some countries, NFPs lack the authority to communicate information related to public-health
emergencies to WHO in a timely manner».
93Security Council, resolution n. 2177, preamble: «Recalling the International Health Regulations (2005), which are contributing to glo
bal public health security by providing a framework for the coordination of the management of events that may constitute a public health
emergency of international concern, and aim to improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify and respond to public health
threats and underscoring the importance of WHOMember States abiding by these commitments». See also para. 9 of the same resolution:
«The SecurityCouncil […] UrgesMember States to implement relevant TemporaryRecommendations issued under the InternationalHealth
Regulations (2005) regarding the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa […]». For an overview of the implications of this Resolution see
Ludovica Poli, “La risoluzione n. 2177 (2014) del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite e la qualificazione dell’epidemia di ebola come
minaccia alla pace ed alla sicurezza internazionale”, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 9, no. 1 (2015): 238–245.
94Lawrence O. Gostin, Erica A. Friedman, “Ebola: a crisis in global health leadership”, in The Lancet Global Health 384, no. 9951 (2014):
1324, available at www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(14)61791-8/fulltext?rss%3Dyes.
95See Louis Balmond, "Le Conseil de sécurité et la crise d’Ebola: entre gestion de la paix et pilotage de la gouvernance globale", in
Questions of International Law, Zoom In 10, (2014): 5-25. See also, and in particular, Gian Luca Burci, "Ebola, the Security Council and the
securitization of public health", inibid.: 27–39, whose reflection, at page 28, are interesting: «In its operative part, the resolution urges mem-
ber states to implement the temporary recommendations referred to above, arguably with regard to both positive measures to implement
as well as unnecessary overreactions. The general tone of those provisions and the fact that they were partly placed in the preambular part
of the resolution suggests that their purpose is to extend political support and generate more commitment to a legal instrument whose
crucial role for an effective and balanced response to the outbreak has not been matched by a high level of compliance».
96See Elisabeth Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies. An Analysis of Countermeasures (Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984),
104–106.
97On this issue, see more in general Frédéric Dopagne, Les contre-mesures des organisations internationals (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2010); id.,
“Countermeasures by International Organisations: The Decentralised Society in the Heart of the Institutionalized Society”, in Select Pro-
ceedings of the European Society of International Law, ed. Héléne Ruiz-Fabri et al (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), 204 ff. See also Pierre Klein,
La responsabilité des organisations internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et en droit des gens (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1998) 396–409.
98See more extensively on this issue Esa Paasivirta, Allan Rosas, “Sanctions, Countermeasures and Related Actions in the External Re-
lations of the EU: A Search for Legal Frameworks” and Paolo Palchetti, “Reactions of the European Union to Breaches of Erga Omnes
obligations”, both in The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, ed. Enzo Cannizzaro (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
2002), 207–218 and 219–230. On the recent sanction imposed by the EuropeanUnion on Russia for the facts occurred in Crimea see Pasquale
De Sena, Lorenzo Gradoni, “Crimea: le ragioni del torto (russo) e il torto delle ragioni (occidentali)”, in Quaderni di SIDIBlog 1 (2014): 5 ff.,
at 17.
99Christiane Ahlborn, “The Rules of International Organizations and the Law of International Responsibility”, in International Organisa-
tions Law Review 8, no. 2 (2011): 451. See also Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies. An Analysis of Countermeasures, 105. See also Yann Kerbrat,
“Sanctions et contre-mesures: risques de confusion dans les Articles de la CDI sur la responsabilité des organisations internationales”, in
Revue Belge de Droit International 46, no. 1 (2013): 103–110.
100Frédéric Dopagne, “Sanctions and countermeasures by international organizations. Diverging lessons from the idea of autonomy”, in
International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy. Institutional Independence in the International Legal Order, ed. Richard Collins, Nigel D.
White (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 267 ff.
101Dopagne, “Countermeasures by International Organisations: The Decentralised Society in the Heart of the Institutionalized Society”,
206.
102Dopagne, “Sanctions and countermeasures by international organizations. Diverging lessons from the idea of autonomy”, 274.
103The United States’ Reelection to the UNESCO Executive Board, available at 2009–2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/11/249414.htm.
104See accordingly Sarooshi, International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers, 111–114.
105More in general see Thordi Ingadòttir, “Financing international institutions”, in Research Handbook on the Law of International Organisa-
tions, ed. Jan Klabbers, Åsa Wallendhal (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 108 ff.
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106Draft articles on the responsibility of international organisations, with commentaries (DARIO), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission,
2011, vol. II, Part Two, para. 88. On this issues see Paolo Palchetti, “Unità, pluralità o inutilità dei regimi di responsabilità internazionale
applicabili alle organizzazioni?”, in Il futuro delle organizzazioni internazionali. Prospettive giuridiche. Atti del XIX Convegno della Società italiana
di Diritto internazionale, Courmayeur, 16–18 giugno 2014, ed. Michele Vellano (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 2015), 49–52.
107DARIO, art. 22: «1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, the wrongfulness of an act of an international organisation not in conformity with
an international obligation towards a State or another international organisation is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes
a countermeasure taken in accordance with the substantive and procedural conditions required by international law, including those
set forth in Chapter II of Part Four for countermeasures taken against another international organisation. 2. Subject to paragraph 3, an
international organisation may not take countermeasures against a responsible member State or international organisation unless: (a)
the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are met; (b) the countermeasures are not inconsistent with the rules of the organisation; and
(c) no appropriate means are available for otherwise inducing compliance with the obligations of the responsible State or international
organisation concerning cessation of the breach and reparation. 3. Countermeasures may not be taken by an international organisation
against amember State or international organisation in response to a breach of an international obligationunder the rules of the organisation
unless such countermeasures are provided for by those rules».
108Ibid., Commentary, para. 6.
109Simone Vezzani, “Countermeasures by Member States against International Organizations”, in Responsibility of International Organisa-
tions. Essays in Honour of Sir Ian Brownlie, 373 ff.
110Supra, para. 1.
111As noted earlier (supra, para. 2), among the function of the WHO the right to health is of a paramount importance.
112See accordinglyArt. 5 of the resolution «Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law» adopted in Krakow, in 2005, by the Institut
de droit international, available on the website: www.justitiaetpace.org.
113For an overview of this practice see Pierre Klein, La responsabilité des organisations internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et en
droit des gens, 401–402.
114See Andrew P. Cortell, Susan Peterson, “Dutiful agents, rogue actors or both? Staffing, voting rules and slack in the WHO and WTO”,
inDelegation and agency in international organizations, ed. Darren G. Hawkins et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 265–266.
More in general, on the role of the technical bodies in interpreting the competences of international organisations see Ingo Venzke, How
Interpretation Makes International Law. On Semantic Change and Normative Twists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 77–78.
115For a broad discussion on the doctrine of implied powers see Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International legal personality and implied powers
of international organizations, in British Yearbook of International Law 44 (1970): 111 ff.
116«As a measure of precaution WHO is now recommending that persons travelling to Hong Kong and Guangdong Province of China
consider postponing all but essential travel. This temporary recommendation will be reassessed in the light of the evolution of the epi-
demic in the areas currently indicated, and other areas of the world could become subject to similar recommendations if the situation
demands». WHO, Travel advice – Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, and Guangdong Province, China, 2 April 2003, available at
www.who.int/csr/sarsarchive/2003_04_02/en/.
117WHO, WHO extends its SARS-related travel advice to Beijing and Shanxi Province in China and to Toronto, Canada, 23 April 2003, available
at www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2003/np7/en/.
118Kamradt-Scott, “Who, Global Health Security & International Law”, 236.
119IHR, art. 43, para. 3: «A State Party implementing additional health measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article which signifi-
cantly interfere with international traffic shall provide to WHO the public health rationale and relevant scientific information for it. WHO
shall share this information with other States Parties and shall share information regarding the health measures implemented».
120Ibid., para. 4: «After assessing information provided pursuant to paragraph 3 and 5 of this Article and other relevant information,WHO
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